The Third Anglo-Mysore War (1790–1792) marked a decisive turning point in the geopolitics of 18th-century South Asia. Unlike the first two wars, which ended in stalemates that preserved the Kingdom of Mysore’s formidable standing, this conflict dismantled the territorial dominance of the Sultanate of Mysore and firmly established the British East India Company (EIC) as the paramount political and military arbiter in southern India.
Cornwallis receiving Tipu’s hostage sons (1792). Source: National Army Museum Collection
Origins and Causes of the War
The underlying tensions of the conflict stemmed from unsettled rivalries following the 1784 Treaty of Mangalore, compounded by Tipu Sultan’s modernization drive and aggressive diplomatic posture.
- Unresolved Friction from Mangalore (1784): The Treaty of Mangalore had concluded the Second Anglo-Mysore War on the basis of status quo ante bellum, but both sides treated it merely as a truce. Neither the EIC nor Tipu abandoned their regional ambitions.
- Tipu Sultan’s Geopolitical Counterweight: Tipu sent diplomatic embassies to France, the Ottoman Empire, and Afghanistan, seeking military alliances to expel the British from the subcontinent. The British viewed his overtures to Revolutionary-era France as an existential threat to their colonial monopoly.
- The Strategic Role of Travancore: In the south, the Kingdom of Travancore—a British ally protected under the Treaty of Mangalore—fortified the Nedumkotta (Travancore Lines) along its northern border. In 1789, the Raja of Travancore purchased the strategic coastal forts of Cranganore (Kodungallur) and Ayacottah from the Dutch East India Company. Tipu contested this sale, arguing that the forts were situated within the territory of the Zamorin of Calicut, a tributary vassal of Mysore.
- The British Triple Alliance: Lord Cornwallis, Governor-General of the East India Company, circumvented the non-intervention mandates of Pitt’s India Act of 1784 by exploiting Travancore’s treaty status. Cornwallis forged a formal Triple Alliance between the British, the Maratha Empire, and the Nizam of Hyderabad, promising them territorial partitions of Mysore’s northern domains upon victory.
How the War Began: The Spark at the Travancore Lines
In December 1789, Tipu led an army to the Travancore Lines to enforce his tributary claims and dismantle the newly fortified positions. An initial Mysore assault on December 28 breached the lines but was repelled during a counterattack, with Tipu narrowly escaping physical injury.
By April 1790, Tipu regrouped and successfully demolished the fortifications. Cornwallis seized on this incursion into an allied state as a direct violation of the Treaty of Mangalore, declaring war on Mysore in May 1790.
Course of the Conflict (1790–1792)
The war unfolded across three principal phases, transitioning from early British miscalculations to Cornwallis taking direct personal command:
1. General Medows’ Initial Offensive (1790)
The Madras Presidency army under General William Medows attempted a southern thrust through Coimbatore to secure the passes into the Mysore plateau. Tipu exploited his superior cavalry, interior supply lines, and rapid troop mobility to outmaneuver Medows, isolating British detachments, retaking territory in the Carnatic, and turning the southern campaign into an operational failure for the Company.
2. Cornwallis Takes Personal Command (1791)
Recognizing the tactical impasse, Cornwallis arrived in Madras in late 1790 to take direct theater command. He shifted the axis of invasion westward through Vellore and the Mugli Pass into the heart of Mysore:
- Siege of Bangalore (February–March 1791): Cornwallis captured Bangalore’s town (pettah) and stormed its fortified citadel on March 21, securing a vital supply hub and forward operational base.
- First Advance on Seringapatam (May 1791): Advancing along the Kaveri River, Cornwallis defeated Tipu in open battle at Arakere (May 15), but severe monsoons, starvation of draft cattle, and depleted supply lines forced him to destroy his siege artillery and withdraw toward Bangalore before Maratha reinforcements under Haripant and Parashuram Bhau arrived.
3. The Encirclement and Final Siege (1791–1792)
Over the latter half of 1791, Cornwallis methodically neutralized Mysore’s hill fortresses (droogs)—most notably Savandurga and Nandidurga—securing his rear communications. In January 1792, a combined allied force consisting of British regulars, Madras and Bombay sepoys, Maratha horsemen, and the Nizam’s forces converged on Mysore’s capital:
- The Assault on Seringapatam (February 1792): Cornwallis executed a surprise night assault on February 6, breaches were established along the northern redoubts, and allied siege works systematically trapped Tipu’s garrison inside the island fortress. Isolated from external assistance and facing total destruction of his capital, Tipu initiated peace overtures.
The Treaty of Seringapatam (March 1792)
Signed on March 18, 1792, the Treaty of Seringapatam imposed severe punitive terms on Mysore:
| Treaty Clause | Terms & Territorial Adjustments |
|---|---|
| Territorial Cessions | Mysore surrendered roughly half of its territory to the Triple Alliance. |
| EIC Acquisitions | Gained the Malabar Coast (vital for the pepper and spice trade), Baramahal, Dindigul, and the Salem district, effectively blocking Mysore’s direct access to the Arabian Sea. |
| Allied Gains | The Marathas received territories extending up to the Tungabhadra River; the Nizam of Hyderabad gained lands from the Krishna River down to the Pennar River (including Cuddapah). |
| War Indemnity | Tipu was assessed a massive fine of 33 million rupees (3.3 crore rupees), payable immediately in gold or bullions. |
| Hostage Princes | As guarantee for the indemnity, two of Tipu’s young sons—Princes Abdul Khaliq (age 8) and Muiz-ud-Din (age 5)—were delivered into British custody under Cornwallis until full payment was rendered. |
Historical Impact and Consequences
On Mysore and Tipu Sultan
- Economic and Geostrategic Crippling: Stripped of the fertile agricultural lowlands of Coimbatore and Baramahal, as well as the commercial ports of the Malabar coast, Mysore became a landlocked state. Its tax base shrank dramatically, curtailing the resources Tipu had used to fund administrative experiments and military modernization.
- Financial Resilience: Tipu managed to pay the war indemnity within two years, successfully securing the return of his sons in 1794.
- Unbroken Defiance: Rather than capitulate to secondary status, Tipu rebuilt his fortified lines, deepened negotiations with the French Directory and Napoleon Bonaparte, and aggressively restructured domestic manufacturing (particularly rocketry and iron foundries). This defiance set the inevitable stage for the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War in 1799, where Tipu was killed defending his capital.
On the British East India Company and Imperial Rule
- Transition to Direct Sovereignty: The Third Anglo-Mysore War marked the EIC’s permanent transition from a coastal commercial corporation relying on puppet nawabs to an aggressive territorial hegemon. Controlling Baramahal and Malabar provided defensive depth for both the Madras and Bombay Presidencies.
- The “Subsidiary” Precedent and Cornwallis’s Realpolitik: Cornwallis deliberately left Mysore intact rather than annexing it entirely in 1792, famous for remarking: “We have effectively crippled our enemy without making our friends too formidable.” By keeping Mysore as a buffer, the EIC prevented both the Maratha confederacy and the Nizam from absorbing the entire southern peninsula.
- Blueprint for Imperial Expansion: The campaign demonstrated that the Company could marshal allied Indian armies, handle vast multi-theater logistical coordination, and enforce punishing economic indemnity regimes. When Lord Wellesley arrived in 1798 as Governor-General, the diminished state of Mysore made the implementation of the Subsidiary Alliance system and the final subjugation of peninsular India rapid and conclusive.
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